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Abstract: Financial crises are complex phenomena, in terms of the triggering factors, duration and 
severity, impact on both financial system and macroeconomic fundamentals and the full range of costs 
arising from its occurrence. The paper aims at providing an updated picture on the magnitude the 2008 
financial crisis had, in terms of economic costs incurred by EU member states. It has been briefly 
reviewed crises’ main monetary and economic effects and costs. Then it has been employed 
International Monetary Fund’s approach for measuring crisis severity, expressed as an output loss 
indicator. To check the stability of the results, the basic methodology relying on a 3-year GDP trend 
has been complemented with a 7-year GDP trend. The output losses recorded by each EU country, 
under both trend assumptions, showed that Baltic states and Greece had been the most affected as they 
cumulated the highest losses. The lowest output losses have been registered in Western Europe 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Poland). Most EU economies’ growth still hasn’t 
entered on a robust ascending path, as they haven’t reached the level of GDP trend computed for the 
period preceding the onset of the financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction  
There is a broad literature devoted to the study of financial crises triggers, frequency, 
costs, severity and predictive variables. One of the research questions that preoccupy 
both practitioners and academia relates to the reliable estimation of crises’ severity.  
Commonly, the severity of financial crises has been measured in terms of the fiscal 
costs imposed on by crisis resolution frameworks (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 
1997; Frydl, 1999), of the magnitude of output losses, of declines in stock market 
indexes (Caballero, Candelaria and Hale 2009), of global trade drop measured as 
export and import price indices (IMF Survey, 2010), of economic slowdown 
(Tjahjawandita, Pradono, Rinaldi 2009) computed as the difference in GDP growth 
rates between two successive years. However, none of these indicators reflect 
comprehensively the overall costs an economy is exposed to.  
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In this respect, Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2003) stated that it is not possible 
to isolate the effect of a banking crisis on GDP level from other shocks or leading 
factors, therefore none of output loss measures developed by economic literature 
correctly capture the effect of the banking crisis on GDP and the full economic costs 
of a banking crisis. 
Most empirical studies have attempted to quantify the economic cost associated with 
a financial crisis by estimating the magnitude of output loss. In this respect, 
Angkinand (2005) believes that this measure is the most suited as it reflects the short-
run adjustment of output. In addition, any policymakers’ attempt to contain or tackle 
financial crises has to take into account the potential output losses accompanying 
crisis episodes (Kapp & Vega 2014).  
In a study focused on empirically measuring the 2008 global financial crisis’ 
severity, Rose and Spiegel (2011) have employed four observable variables meant 
to quantify crisis’ severity, namely: the 2008 real GDP growth, the percentage 
change in a broad measure of the national stock market over 2008, the 2008 
percentage change in the SDR exchange rate and the change in a country’s 
creditworthiness rating. Finally, they chose as a measure for crisis intensity the 2008-
2009 GDP growth.  
The paper aims at assessing the output loss recorded by each EU member state 
following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, by relying on International Monetary 
Fund’s methodology. It is structured as follows: section two reviews briefly the main 
effects and costs associated to episodes of financial turbulence; section three depicts 
the methodology employed for computing the output losses recorded by EU member 
countries and presents the results obtained. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Review of Banking Crises’ Effects and Costs 
In the economic literature different meanings have emerged regarding the 
identification and definition of financial turbulence events, while their length and 
severity, reflected by costs incurred, are still difficult to be accurately quantified. 
Generally, the effects on affected countries follow a similar pattern and produce, 
inevitably, a state of economic instability. In the following it has been summarized 
the main effects of financial crises, namely: 
- effects on monetary policy. One monetary tool central banks have at their disposal 
is the lender of last resort function. By exercising it, the full economy would be 
exposed to the inflation tax. Inflation tax has often been perceived as a disputed, but 
necessary compromise, to restore the functioning of credit institutions in difficulty. 
Although the monetary policy primary objective is to maintain price stability, the 
central bank is also responsible for ensuring the robustness of the banking system, 
which in crisis situations materializes in the injection of liquidity. The difficulty is 
ŒCONOMICA 
 119 
to distinguish between liquidity requests coming from solvent credit institutions, but 
facing a temporary shortage of liquid assets, and those from inadequately capitalized 
institutions. 
If central banks and government ‘s interventions provide liquidity for distressed 
banks, would induce a state of moral hazard, the  short and medium term effects 
taking the form of lending expansion, interbank interest rate reductions and domestic 
currency depreciation. In other words, credit institutions with solvency problems will 
be tempted to continue lending activity, in order to improve profitability (by volume 
of new loans granted and / or spread of interest rates charged), without necessarily 
achieving a restructuring of customer selection practices and monitoring of 
outstanding claims, or using liquidity injections for recapitalization purposes. In this 
case, the central bank will have to strengthen monetary policy, through open market 
operations to sterilize the excess liquidity, monetary policy interest rate or reserve 
ratio increases, foreign currency sales etc. 
- effects on the payment system. Regardless of the banking system size, the 
emergence of a generalized crisis contributes, inevitably, to the damage of the 
smooth functioning of payment systems. This situation has direct and immediate 
impact on all economic and financial entities, because it means stopping the clearing 
and settlement mechanisms, processing with difficulty all payments arising from 
production, distribution and consumption processes. 
Reiterating the crucial role of the payment system in a country's economy, one could 
ask to what extent its functioning could be affected by failures of individual credit 
institutions or the emergence of a contagion effect across the entire banking system. 
In a financial stability report published by the Central Bank of Sweden (2003) it is 
argued that a credit institution is a systemically important one for the payment system 
functioning if it manages a considerable amount of payment instruments, if 
intermediates a significant percentage of payments in the economy or if any 
difficulties affecting it can spread to other financial institutions. 
- effects on economic growth. In an early study conducted by the IMF (1998) it is 
shown that GDP growth rate will reach the level previously recorded after three years 
from crisis end. Honohan, Klingebiel (2000) argued that one of three banking crises 
that have affected developing countries has generated a cumulative output loss of 
over 20% of GDP. At a similar result arrived also Hoggarth, Reis, Saporta (2001), 
which revealed, in addition, that output losses due to a crisis are higher in developed 
than emerging countries. 
In a survey of 18 financial crises that have affected OECD countries since 1970, 
Reinhart, Rogoff (2008) have established that, in the first year from the onset of the 
crisis, economic growth compressed on average by 1.25%, and in the next two years 
it compressed with 2.25% from the year preceding the crisis. In addition, the authors 
showed that in situations where the economic downturn is preceded by imbalances 
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in the financial sector (especially in the banking sector), the recession will be more 
severe and prolonged. 
Empirical analyses of Angkinand (2008) showed that countries taking recourse in 
times of crisis to a broader deposit guarantee recorded, on average, a lower level of 
economic growth loss, justifying therefore the role of deposit insurance as a safety 
net and reiterating the function of preventing the phenomena of bank runs and 
protecting the payment system.  
- effects on lending activity. During the occurrence of a crisis, credit institutions 
could adopt two diametrically opposite attitudes. Insolvent institutions, characterized 
by low profitability and liquidity, might take on excessive risks in order to improve 
solvency. Creditworthy, relatively stable banks, which experienced a slight 
deterioration in the asset portfolio, might show a pronounced aversion to risk, 
refusing to lend even to eligible applicants, so as to not increase the share of risky 
assets in total assets and to not reduce the minimum solvency ratio. The result will 
be a severe credit crunch, with negative effects on the real sector, consumption and 
investment, on production capacity and economic growth. In addition, once the 
credit channel fails to fulfill its function, it cannot be used anymore as a monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. 
- effects on consumption. Empirical tests performed by Barrell, Davis, Pomerantz 
(2004) have highlighted the fact that open economies, with liberalized financial 
markets and a high level of household indebtedness, which were exposed to an 
episode of banking crisis, experienced a collapse in consumption, while reducing 
lending. 
- loss of public confidence in the authorities’ ability to solve the crisis and restore the 
status of financial and economic stability. Effects may result in capital outflows, 
exposing the banking system to liquidity risk (risk amplified by volatile capital 
flows) and currency risk, but also the discouragement of saving behavior, people 
preferring to hold, at least in the short term cash, a phenomenon known in economic 
literature as "flight to quality". 
Ultimately, the implications of the financial crises have negative repercussions on 
financial stability, which may translate into a deterioration of the countries’ rating, 
with prospects of a worsening investment climate. 
All these adverse effects will further translate into several categories of costs, such 
as: 
- fiscal costs, born by taxpayers, arise from government actions that involve an 
expenditure of public funds. Examples of such actions, associated to banking 
system’s rehabilitation activities are: the provision of liquidity through the central 
bank lender of last resort function, recapitalization of distressed banks through 
capital injections, the total guarantee of deposits, search of private investors. 
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Studying 42 past episodes of banking crises, during the period 1970-2007, Laeven, 
Valencia (2008) estimated that fiscal costs, net of recoveries, associated with crisis 
management measures can be substantial, averaging at about 13.3 percent of GDP, 
and can be as high as 55.1 percent of GDP. 
Analyzing the scope of government actions on the size of fiscal costs, Honohan, 
Klingebiel (2000) noted that if governments hadn’t excessively appealed to a large 
number of practices to save banks in difficulty, average fiscal costs would have been 
limited to 1% of GDP. On the opposite, if authorities were to apply simultaneously 
all bailing out strategies, fiscal costs would have exceeded 60% of GDP. 
- economic costs, due to gradual and slow government intervention. Frydl and 
Quintyn (2000) draw attention on the moral hazard induced by the prolonged bailing 
out process, by the fact that institutions benefiting from government intervention will 
be tempted to adopt a risk taking attitude, having the potential of an increase in the 
initial costs. This idea is supported also by Barrell, Davis, Pomerantz (2004), arguing 
that a quick resolution is more appropriate than a tolerant attitude, that would 
encourage moral hazard, would increase costs for taxpayers and would help to brake 
economic growth. 
Delays in taking prompt corrective action directly affect the cost and duration of the 
crisis. On the other hand, studies conducted by Frydl (1999) did not reveal a 
significant positive correlation between crisis length and its costs. In contrast, 
between crisis length and the dynamics of economic growth was reported a positive 
correlation. Thus, for periods up to one year, economic growth is not affected; 
instead, crisis episodes between 2 and 7 years are correlated with significant 
reductions in economic growth. 
Laeven, Valencia (2008) considered that output losses (measured as deviations from 
trend GDP) induced by systemic banking crises can be large, with an average of 
about 20% of GDP during the first four years of the crisis, and ranging from 0 percent 
to a high of 98 percent of GDP. 
-social costs, generated by the propagation of macroeconomic and financial turmoil 
to the real sector. Can be represented by rising unemployment, inflation, declining 
real income, lower living standards due to erosion of purchasing power, the 
deterioration of public health and educational climate. 
- political costs, represented by changes in government strategy, the adoption of 
unpopular measures, especially relative to fiscal policy and wage level, likely to 
erode confidence / sympathy of the electorate in the ruling party, the possible 
deterioration of the country rating with negative effects on capital inflows and 
external financing.  
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3. Output Loss Estimation Methodologies 
The remaining part of the paper focuses on economic costs, with emphasis on 
measuring their amplitude by means of an output loss approach. In the economic 
literature there is no consensus on the most appropriate method for calculating output 
losses. Some studies employ the real GDP level (Hoggarth, Reis, Saporta, 2001; 
Mulder & Rocha, 2001; Angkinand, 2005) while others (IMF 1998; Bordo, 
Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria, 2001; Honohan & Klingebiel, 2003; 
Claessens, Klingebiel, Laeven, 2003) use the real GDP growth rate.  
Kapp and Vega (2014) argue that output costs generated by financial crises are very 
heterogeneous; consequently, they dismiss the indicator variable approach in favor 
of the output gap approach. By employing a broad database of financial crises 
covering 170 countries from 1970 until present, they uncovered the heterogeneous 
nature of output losses and the fact that a large number of countries hadn’t succeed 
in recovering their pre-crises growth rates or trends. Their results indicate that 
average output losses generated by debt crises are 9% higher than those generated 
by banking crises, while currency crises incurred the smallest losses. 
To estimate the current output loss generated by the 2008 financial crisis, it had been 
applied the methodology described in IMF World Economic Outlook (1998), which 
computes it as the sum of the differences between the GDP growth rate and trend 
growth rates, during the period between the crisis starting year and the year in which 
the economy reaches its pre-crisis trend growth. The GDP growth trend is calculated 
as an average of GDP growth rates recorded in the three years preceding the starting 
year of the crisis. 
 It should be mentioned that the average number of years considered for computing 
the trend growth rate may differ from three (IMF 1998) to five (Bordo, Eichengreen, 
Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria 2001) or ten years (Hoggarth, Reis, Saporta 2001). 
However, Mulder and Rocha (2001) argued that, by emphasizing different pre-crisis 
periods to calculate the trend growth rate, the estimated magnitude of output loss 
does not change significantly. 
A more recent opinion belongs to Smith (2012), claiming that the level of pre-crisis 
GDP trend might prove misleading when used for measuring the severity of a crisis. 
It is the case of crises which have been preceded by a boom and hence the economic 
growth is unsustainable fast and high, inflated by confidence in economic prospects. 
Consequently, these GDP levels are not suited for computing trend and use it as 
benchmark for measuring output loss. This drawback might be removed usually by 
considering longer time periods as a basis for computing GDP trend or by applying 
statistical filters such as Hodrick-Prescott.  
Data on GDP growth rate has been collected from Eurostat database, covering the 
2001 – 2014 years. To check the robustness and stability of the output losses to be 
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computed, the GDP trend has been calculated for the 3 years respectively the 7 years 
preceding the onset of the financial crisis. The computation algorithm for the output 
loss measure mimics the one proposed by IMF and detailed above. 
Table 2. EU member states’ output loss after the 2008 financial crisis 
Country 3 year trend 7 year trend 
3 year output 
loss 
7 year output 
loss 
EU(28 
countries) 2.83 2.24 -19.13 -15.00 
Euro area (19 
countries) 2.70 1.97 -19.60 -14.50 
Belgium 2.50 2.00 -13.60 -10.10 
Bulgaria 6.47 5.76 -38.47 -33.50 
Czech Rep. 6.27 4.53 -41.17 -29.00 
Denmark 2.33 1.60 -19.53 -14.40 
Germany 2.57 1.34 -12.67 -4.10 
Estonia 9.27 8.17 -65.67 -58.00 
Ireland 5.37 5.13 -39.37 -37.70 
Greece 3.40 4.20 -52.60 -58.20 
Spain 3.90 3.49 -32.30 -29.40 
France 2.13 1.81 -12.53 -10.30 
Croatia 4.73 4.64 -43.93 -43.30 
Italy 1.47 1.21 -19.37 -17.60 
Cyprus 4.43 3.80 -37.83 -33.40 
Latvia 10.53 9.09 -77.63 -67.50 
Lithuania 8.77 8.21 -55.87 -52.00 
Luxembourg 5.17 4.03 -28.27 -20.30 
Hungary 2.93 3.61 
Trend reached 
in 2014 
Trend reached 
in 2014 
Malta 3.20 1.93 
Trend reached 
in 2014 
Trend reached 
in 2014 
Netherlands 3.43 2.07 -23.83 -14.30 
Austria 3.03 2.10 -17.13 -10.60 
Poland 5.63 4.03 -17.63 -6.40 
Portugal 1.63 1.21 -17.93 -15.00 
Romania 6.40 6.27 -36.20 -35.30 
Slovenia 5.53 4.37 -42.43 -34.30 
Slovakia 8.50 6.31 -46.50 -31.20 
Finland 4.03 3.16 -33.03 -26.90 
Sweden 3.63 3.06 -19.43 -15.40 
UK 2.80 2.83 
Trend reached 
in 2014 
Trend reached 
in 2014 
As it can be noted from table 1, Hungary, Malta and United Kingdom reached their 
growth trend in 2014, while most of the sample still records an ongoing output loss.  
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For the EU 27, the average GDP growth rate in the three years previous the financial 
crisis onset was of 2.83% and 2.24% in the 7 previous years, while countries in euro 
zone recorded an average GDP growth of 2.7% and respectively 1.97%.  
Although the national authorities have promptly implemented monetary and fiscal 
measures, to contain crisis propagation across countries and stabilize financial 
systems, its adverse effects still last and economic growth is still in a recovery 
process.  
The cost of the financial crisis, expressed in terms of output loss, had recorded the 
highest levels in Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Greece, ranging 
between 77.6% in Latvia and 52.6% in Greece (in the assumption of a 3 year trend), 
respectively between 67.5% and 52% (in the assumption of a 7 year trend).  At the 
opposite are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Poland, with the smallest 
output losses ranging between 13 – 18% (in the assumption of a 3 year trend), 
respectively 4 – 11% (in the assumption of a 7 year trend).   
The results obtained confirm the forecast made by Atoyan, Cerutti, Ramakrishnan 
(2009), which empirically modeled the probability of crisis exit for a number of 
emerging countries in Europe, indicating that they are likely to experience a longer 
period of economic imbalances, until they overcome the crisis. According to their 
analysis, for emerging countries in Europe the average probability of exit from the 
crisis at the end of 2010 is of only 30%. Of these countries, those which initially 
showed a high level of external debt and current account deficit are likely to face a 
prolonged crisis episode. Kondor and Staehr (2011) too, found out that the Baltic 
States recorded the widest output contractions, and hence output losses during the 
global financial crisis. Ball (2014)’s empirical study stated that the global financial 
crisis triggered national recessions of varying severity, but in most cases losses in 
potential output are large. The hardest-hit OECD countries were those in the 
periphery of the euro area, which experienced severe banking and debt crises. 
After having investigating the evolution of real per capita GDP for 100 systemic 
banking crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) have found that on average, it takes 
around eight years until reach the pre-crisis level of income, while the median is 
about 6 years and a half.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been to yield a snapshot of economic costs associated 
to the global financial crisis, from its onset until present. The indicator chosen had 
been the output loss, which varied widely across EU countries during this crisis.  
lthough there is a large number of intrinsic or external factors that contribute to the 
differences in output losses recorded by the financial crisis-hit countries, 
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undoubtedly the initial macroeconomic conditions and domestic policy responses of 
monetary decision makers and government heavily influenced the path of output 
costs following the crisis onset. This reasoning has also been outlined in a study 
published as part of the IMF World Economic Outlook 2009. According to the study, 
while there is a strong relationship between the initial economic conditions and the 
size of the ultimate output loss, short-run macroeconomic stimulus and sustained 
structural reform efforts may help reduce output losses over the medium run. As the 
European Economic Forecast (2011, p.8) stated, differences in the speed of recovery 
among EU countries are related to the degree to which economies were hit by the 
shock (regardless of the transmission channel: housing and real-estate bubble burst, 
financial sector or trade links) and the number of challenges faced. In addition, it 
should be taken into account the specificity of EU, which is built on the framework 
of a regional development. As Davidescu and Strat (2014) mentioned, regional 
development gravitates around the broad desideratum of mitigating economic and 
financial disparities across countries and regions. 
 
5. Acknowledgement  
This paper was co-financed from the European Social Fund, through the Sectoral 
Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, project 
number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138907 “Excellence in scientific interdisciplinary 
research, doctoral and postdoctoral, in the economic, social and medical fields –
EXCELIS”,  coordinator The Bucharest University of Economic Studies 
 
6. References 
Angkinand, A. (2005). The Output Costs of Financial Crises: Investigation of the Roles of Crisis-
Management Policies and Political Institutions. Dissertation. Claremont Graduate University. 
Angkinand, A.P. (2008). Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, doi: 10.1016/j.intfin.2007.12.001 
Ball L. (2014). Long-term damage from the great recession in OECD countries. Johns Hopkins 
University 
Barrell, R., Davis, E.P. & Pomerantz, O. (2004). Costs of financial instability, household sector balance 
sheets and consumption. NIESR and Brunel University. 
Boitan I. (2011). Crize bancare si sisteme de avertizare timpurie/Banking crisis and early warning 
systems. Bucharest: ASE. 
Bordo, M., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D., & Martinez-Peria, M.S. (2001). Financial Crises Lessons 
from the Last 120 years. Economic Policy, April: 53-82. 
Caballero, J., Candelaria, C. & Hale, G. (2009). Bank Relationships and the Depth of the Current 
Economic Crisis. FRBSF Economic Letter 2009-38. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    Vol 11, no 4, 2015 
 126 
Central Bank of Sweden (2003). Can a bank failure threaten the payment system? Financial Stability 
Report, no. 1/2003 pp. 75-92.  
Claessens, S., Klingebiel, D. & Laeven, L. (2003). Resolving Systemic Crises:  Policies and Institutions, 
presented at the conference. Systemic Financial Distress: Containment and Resolution. Held at the 
World Bank, October 8-9, 2003 
Davidescu, A.A. & Strat, V. (2014). Coordinates of a New Romanian Regional Policy - Identifying the 
Development Poles. A Case Study. Informatica Economică/Economic Informatics, vol. 18, no. 2/2014, 
pp. 88-99.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Detragiache, E. (1997). The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence from 
Developing and Developed Countries. IMF Working Paper WP/97/106. 
Frydl, E.J. (1999). The length and cost of banking crises. IMF Working Paper WP/99/30. 
Frydl, E.J. & Quintyn, M. (2000). The benefits and costs of intervening in banking crises. IMF Working 
Paper WP/00/147. 
Hoggarth, G.; Reis, R. & Saporta, V. (2001). Costs of Banking System Instability: Some Empirical 
Evidence. Bank of England Working Paper No. 144. 
Honohan, P. (2001). Recapitalizing banking systems. Implications for incentives and fiscal and 
monetary policy. Policy Research Working Paper WPS 2540, World Bank. 
Honohan, P. & Klingebiel, D. (2000). Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises. World Bank Policy 
Research Paper, No. 2441, Washington DC: World Bank.  
Honohan, P. & Klingebiel, D. (2003). The Fiscal Cost Implications of an Accommodating Approach to 
Banking Crises. Journal of Banking & Finance 27, 1539-1560. 
International Monetary Fund (1998). Financial Crises: Causes and Indicators. World Economic 
Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (2009). Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/res092209a.htm. 
Kapp, D. & Vega, M. (2014). Real Output Costs of Financial Crises: A Loss Distribution Approach. 
Cuadernos de Economía/ Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 37, issue 103, pp. 13-28. 
Kondor, K. & Staehr, K. (2011). The impact of the global financial crisis on output performance across 
the European Union: vulnerability and resilience. Eesti Pank Working Paper 2011/3. 
Mulder, C. & Rocha, M. (2001). The Soundness of Estimates of Output Losses in Currency Crises. 
Manuscript, IMF. 
Reinhart, C.M. & Rogoff, K.S. (2008). Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An 
International Historical Comparison. NBER working paper 13761, January. 
Reinhart, C.M. & Rogoff, K.S. (2014). Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes, 
prepared for the American Economic Association 2014 Annual Meeting session Recessions and 
Recoveries. 
Rose, A.K. & Spiegel, M.M. (2011). Cross country causes and consequences of the crisis: an update, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2011-02, http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/files/wp11-02bk.pdf.  
Smith, A. (2012). Measuring the macroeconomic costs of banking crises. Griffith Business School 
Discussion Papers no. 2012-06.  
